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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a private citizen who acts solely at the behest of 
a law enforcement officer and a confidential informant to arrange 
a meeting between that officer and a suspected drug dealer is 
entitled to the defense of entrapment as a matter of law. 
2. Whether a petitioner whose legal counsel is disbarred in 
the process of his criminal defense has enjoyed his right to 
competent counsel as per the Sixth Amendment of the US 
Constitution, Article I Section 12 of Utah's Constitution, and as 
per federal and state case law. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
MATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This case is an appeal of a final judgment of the District 
Court of a criminal conviction on the charge of distribution of a 
controlled substance. The appeal is based on the defense of 
entrapment and inadequacy of counsel. 
PRIOR DISPOSITION 
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After the conviction, defendant's counsel instigated this 
appeal but counsel was dis-barred and disappeared from the 
knowledge of anyone in the Salt Lake area before a brief was filed 
or any material proceedings occurred. The original appeal was 
dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals on April 1, 1991 for failure 
to file an appellant's brief. A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba on January 10, 1992 regarding a new trial. 
The Court there advised the reinstatement of this appeal. After 
hearing before the Utah Court of Appeals on June 17, 1992, the 
Court reinstated this appeal. Defendant's fine has been suspended 
and defendant is not subject to incarceration for any period of 
time. Defendant seeks only to clear his name of an erroneous 
criminal conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Volume 2 indicates the transcript of the 2d day of the trial --
December 14, 1989 on the court reporter's corrected version.) 
While working in Salt Lake City, defendant met a friend named 
Kenny Reed who was out of work, out of money, and out of friends. 
Kenny had also recently been assaulted and was in fear of his life 
from certain drug-dealing individuals. Kenny was also working as 
a confidential informant for drug enforcement officers to avoid 
drug charges against himself. Defendant literally took Kenny in --
he provided food, housing and a job at the company where defendant 
was sales manager. Defendant and Kenny resided together at two 
different locations and worked together on a daily basis.(Record, 
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vol.2, at 10-18.) 
Kenny later introduced defendant to a man named Loydd Hansen 
(aka. Steve Church) who was an undercover drug enforcement officer. 
Officer Hansen asked to be introduced to certain suspected drug 
dealers who happened to be business clients of the defendant (who 
worked as the manager for Omni Call Communications in Salt Lake 
City, selling and leasing cellular phones, pagers, and voice mail 
box systems to businesses in the Salt Lake, Provo, and Ogden 
areas). At the request of Officer Hansen defendant arranged one 
such meeting for Officer Hansen who then contacted the suspect with 
the confidential informant, Kenny Reed.(Record, vol.2, at 21) 
Officer Hansen then asked Defendant to arrange a second 
meeting and asked the defendant to drive him to the meeting point. 
At the meeting place, Officer Hansen then asked the Defendant to 
help with the exchange of cash for a certain amount of cocaine. 
Officer Hansen asked for the meeting, provided the cash, and told 
the Defendant to give the money to Tommy Quintana in exchange for 
cocaine. Defendant then gave the cocaine to Officer 
Hansen.(Record, vol. 2, at 24-27) 
Defendant never personally bought nor sold cocaine. The only 
compensation received by Defendant for helping Officer Hansen was 
the $10 cash for gas and driving to the second meeting with the 
suspect.(Record, vol.2, at 27) Defendant was convicted of abetting 
the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. 
After filing the docketing statement for an appeal of the 
conviction, defendant's counsel Brad Swaner essentially 
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disappeared. This resulted in the dismissal of the appeal for 
appellant's failure to submit a brief. The failure of counsel to 
apply to the court for defendant's release also resulted in the 
defendant remaining incarcerated for 78 days, much longer than what 
the Court had actually required. Defendant's counsel was dis-
barred for, inter alia, neglect of legal matters (Utah Bar Journal, 
Vol. 4, No. 8, at 18). The disbarment was approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court in July 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Beyond any reasonable doubt, defendant was entrapped by law 
enforcement officers — the officers' conduct was such as to 
"creat[e] a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it." 76-2-303(1) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). As a matter of law, defendant is 
entitled to acquittal or, in the alternative, to a new trial since 
he lacked the "culpable mental state" required by statute. 76-1-
501(2)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Furthermore, defendant is entitled to at least a new trial 
since he did not enjoy his right to competent counsel as guaranteed 
by the US Constitution. US Constitution, Amendment VI. As 
interpreted by federal courts, when counsel is dis-barred in the 
course of trial, the defendant is considered per se not to have 
received competent legal representation. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 
F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1991) (stating, inter alia, that in certain 
cases the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 
104 S.Ct.2052 (1984), is not applicable but the Court instead 
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presumes that there has been prejudice.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. Entrapment. 
Under the Utah Criminal Code, a defendant is "presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Utah Code 76-1-501(1). 
"Elements of the offense" include the "culpable mental state 
required." Utah Code 76-1-501(2)(b). Each element of the offense, 
therefore, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant bases his innocence on the defense of entrapment. 
"Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it." Utah Code 76-2-303(1). The Code also provides that 
the defense "is available even though the actor denies commission 
of the conduct charged to constitute the offense." Utah Code 76-2-
303(3). D.efendant freely admits and admitted in court that he did 
facilitate the meetings between Officer Hansen and Tommy Quintana 
even though such an admission is not required by the terms of the 
Entrapment defense. 
Defendant acted, however, without any criminal intent but with 
the intent to assist Officer Hansen in law enforcement activities. 
Any honest citizen when asked to do something by a police officer 
would do so on the assumption that such an act is legal. An 
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example would be a police officer who directs traffic around an 
accident scene or at a Utah Jazz basketball game contrary to 
automated traffic signals. It is safer and legal to act as 
directed by the officer. 
The defendant in the instant case has experience in assisting 
drug enforcement officials. Defendant worked for more than eight 
years with law enforcement for the City of Las Vegas as a Court 
Mediator in Lower Justice Court under the direction of the Las 
Vegas City Attorney's Office (1980 to 1989). Defendant was 
appointed to this office by the Honorable Bill Brier, Mayor of the 
city of Las Vegas, State of Nevada. Prior to and during his 
appointment as Court Mediator, Defendant also worked as a 
professional lobbyist representing more than 350 businesses in 
Nevada to the State Legislature. 
Defendant is also a licensed commercial aircraft pilot and 
worked for the Coconino County Sheriff Department in Arizona from 
1970 to 1972 as a spotter pilot -- helping restrict the flow of 
drug traffic into the United States in the Grand Canyon and Lake 
Mead areas. As a licensed commercial pilot, defendant is required 
to undergo annual drug screening as part of a medical exam.(Record, 
vol. 2, at 5) 
Until 1989 Defendant was also a licensed and bonded Notary 
Public for the State of Nevada. Defendant is a licensed Real 
Estate Broker in the State of Nevada with a practice that has 
lasted over 18 years and handled real estate transactions in excess 
of two million dollars. 
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Currently, Defendant is part owner and manager of a large 
Recreational Vehicle Park in Panguitch, Utah and also maintains an 
ongoing real estate office in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
In light of Defendant's current and past background in law 
enforcement and in the personal and business responsibilities with 
which he has been entrusted, it is not likely -- actually ludicrous 
-- that he would be involved in illicit drug dealing for $10.00 or 
for any other amount of money. 
The actions of any and all participants are not in dispute. 
Any question in this case lies with this element of intent. In the 
trial court, testimony about whether the Defendant knew of Officer 
Hansen's status was heard from four individuals. It is undisputed 
and the record shows that Officer Hansen testified that he never 
personally told the Defendant that Hansen was an undercover 
officer. This testimony proves nothing except what Officer Hansen 
did not say. The confidential informant, Kenny, testified that he 
said nothing to the man who had picked him up off the street and 
fed, clothed, housed, and employed him regarding his relationship 
with Officer Hansen. Kenny also stated in court that he would do 
anything to avoid going to jail -- even lie. (Record, Vol. 1, at ) 
Part of Kenny's "contract" to avoid prison included obtaining 
convictions for Officer Hansen. Sending the Defendant to jail was 
necessary to evade imprisonment. 
Both the Defendant and another witness, Elizabeth Marie Brown, 
who was Kenny's girlfriend, testified that it was open knowledge 
that Kenny was an informant for a law enforcement officer and that 
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Hansen was that officer. 
Of these four witnesses, Hansen's testimony is inconclusive 
regarding the Defendant's knowledge. Kenny, an admitted drug user, 
had powerful motives to fabricate a story to help fulfil his 
"contract" with Officer Hansen. Ms. Brown had no known motive to 
lie and — as Kenny's girlfriend -- would likely know if Kenny 
discussed with other people the relationship between himself and 
Hansen. She testified under oath that Kenny did, in fact, discuss 
his status as an informant for lav; enforcement officials. 
Defendant certainly knows his own mind. Defendant testified and 
again avers that he did know of Officer Hansen's undercover status 
and that his acts were solely for furthering law enforcement 
activities. 
In order for the Defendant to be found guilty, each element of 
the crime had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's 
intent has been proven to be pure and innocent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. There are certainly many doubts that he had any degree of 
the requisite "culpable mental state." Any reasonable degree of 
doubt by law mandates a verdict of "not guilty". In light of the 
facts brought out at trial, a "guilty" verdict was an egregiously 
atrocious miscarriage of justice. As such, with or without any 
further hearing before a court of justice, Defendant/Appellant is 
entitled to the reversal of his conviction. 
Furthermore, it was established at trial that defendant had 
great pity, sympathy, and a close personal relationship with Kenny, 
the confidential informant. Defendant was aware of Kenny's 
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"contract" with Officer Hansen to produce drug-oriented convictions 
and did what he (defendant) felt would aid Kenny in fulfilling his 
contract, thereby avoiding Kenny's arrest, charges, and any other 
consequences of a conviction. 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that such appeals to sympathy, pity, and close personal 
friendships as a matter of law was a method of inducement that 
created a substantial risk that the offense v/ould be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it. The Court stated, "Extreme 
pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, 
pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of 
money, are examples, depending on an evaluation of the 
circumstances in each case, of what might constitute prohibited 
police conduct." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. 
In State v. Cnpps, 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted with approval Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 
1969): "Conversely, instigations which would induce only a person 
engaged in an habitual course of unlawful conduct for gam or 
profit do not constitute entrapment." I_d. r a t 229 (footnote 
omitted; emphasis added). Under this definition, the instant case 
is precisely a case of entrapment. The conduct of Officer Hansen 
and his accomplice in the instant case does not qualify as conduct 
that would induce only a person engaged in an habitual course of 
unlawful conduct; quite the opposite, there is more than a 
"substantial risk" that any law-abiding citizen "not otherwise 
ready to commit" the offense would have acted as the defendant did 
10 
here. 
The Court further stated, in Cripps_; "Therefore, only police 
conduct that 'entraps' those ready and willing to commit the crime 
is acceptable." IcL , at 750 (emphasis added). Officer Hansen did 
exactly so -- he entrapped (by definition) a person who was not 
"ready and willing to commit the crime." None of this detracts 
from the adoption by the Utah Courts of the "objective" test of 
entrapment adopted in Taylor. 
II. INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL 
Defendant did not receive Due Process of law because his 
counsel was not competent to represent a client at a minimum level 
of professional and ethical competence. The Supreme Court of 
Colorado said that enjoyment of this right -- guaranteed in both 
the US Constitution (Amendment VI) and in the Utah Constitution 
(Article I Section 12) -- is "fundamental" to the concept of a fair 
trial, protects the innocent, and maintains the integrity of the 
judicial system. Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17 (Colorado 1985). 
Because defendant's counsel was dis-barred immediately following 
defendant's trial and conviction, defendant feels he was deprived 
of his fundamental right to due process. 
The circumstances in this case are of first impression in this 
state and this Circuit. Utah has adopted the two-prong test for 
inadequacy of counsel given by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 US 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). See, e.g., State v. 
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah App. 1991). The Strickland test calls 
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for a showing that counsel was deficient in some demonstrable 
manner and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
This case, however, differs from the typical case involving 
inadequate counsel. In at least one instance, a federal court has 
distinguished the holding in Strickland. In Bellamy v. Cogdell, 
952 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1991), the US Court of Appeals held that in 
a small class of cases the Court of Appeals does not apply the two-
prong test of Strickland, but instead presumes that there has been 
prejudice. Bellamy was a case where defendant's counsel was 
suspended from the practice of law immediately after defendant's 
trial and counsel did not receive assistance from other counsel 
during trial. The Supreme Court in Strickland -- according to the 
interpretation of the 2nd Circuit in Bellamy -- spoke of such 
cases when it asserted that " [i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, 
prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in 
prejudice." 466 US at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
In Bellamy, the Court followed its prior holding in Solida v. 
United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1983) where Judge Friendly 
opined that the Court must hold counsel inadequate "even where the 
representative apparently furnished reasonably competent 
representation and where the evidence against the defendant was so 
overwhelming that he would almost certainly have been convicted 
regardless of who had represented him." Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 629. 
The Court in Solida concluded that "application of a per se rule 
appears to us to be required in a case like this by the teachings 
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of the Supreme Court . . . ." 709 F.2d at 168. The Second Circuit 
has also applied the per se rule in other cases with slightly 
different circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Novak, 903 
F.2d 883 (2nd Cir. 1990) and United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 
867 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
Under these cases, defendant need not show any specific 
prejudice resulting from his prior counsel's conduct during the 
trial. Counsel's dis-barment in March of 1990 was only a few 
months after defendant's trial -- the first day of which was 
December 13, 1989. Whatever this attorney was doing during the 
latter half of 1989, it led to his dis-barmen and most certainly 
deprived his clients of: 1) "undivided loyalty and effort" Maxwell 
v. Supreme Court of Los Angeles County, 639 P.2d 248 (Calif. 1982) 
(representation may be deficient if client deprived of undivided 
loyalty and effort); 2) a "competent attorney" who will 
"conscientiously protect" the client's interest with no conflicts 
of interest, Rodriguez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska App. 1987); 
and 3) a trial where the "result is reliable," State v. Nash, 694 
P. 2d 222 (Az. 1985). These deprivations certainly cast a shadow of 
doubt on the "integrity of the judicial process." Armstrong v. 
People, 701 P.2d 17 (Color. 1985). 
Particular doubt enters the picture in regards to interactions 
between the prosecutor of the case and defendant's counsel, llr. 
Swaner. During the trial in Judge Ruston's Court, Mr. Swaner 
informed Defendant that the case was "in the bag" because Judge 
Ruston was a former law partner of Mr. Swaner's. Mr. Swaner stated 
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that his feeling was that the Defendant would be acquitted on this 
basis. An ethical and competent lawyer would not make such a 
promise and would not base anything on such a premise 
compromising his own integrity and attempting to implicate a 
respected member of the ]udiciary. 
Mr. Swaner also stated that the prosecutor, Wendy Hufnagel had 
offered him (Mr. Swaner) a 30b with the Special Drug Task Force as 
Counsel for the Task Force. Ms. Hufnagel also stated in 
Defendant's presence that during the trial that Mr. Swaner and 
herself should have lunch to discuss the matter. Not being an 
attorney and unfamiliar with their methods and procedures, 
Defendant felt that he could rest in the hands of this member of 
the bar. To the disillusionment of the Defendant as well as the 
Utah State Bar, Swaner was disbarred. 
In Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court said that a criminal defendant is entitled to 
competence, to a "willingness to identify with the interests of the 
defendant," and presentation of available defenses. Defendant did 
not receive these benefits which are guaranteed by the US 
Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and by the decisions of both 
federal and state courts. Instead, Defendant received only the 
representation of a man who was immediately disbarred and who was 
apparently consorting with his client's opponent in (at least) an 
unseemly manner -- if not a manner that constituted a breach of 
professional conduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and points of law, defendant 
believes he is entitled as a matter of law to reversal of his 
conviction on the defense of Entrapment. In the alternative, the 
doubts cast on the results of the trial by the entrapment defense 
and on the inadequacy of counsel entitle the defendant to a new 
trial in order to clear his name. 
Robert E. Horner 
Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing motion by depositing the same in the US mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: Office of the Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
Dated: Oct. 8, 1992 
Robert Horner 
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